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PROJECT REPORT 2005-7
THE RECOGNITION OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS IN SOUTH
AFRICA: IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
Editor: Rashida Manjoo*

1) Introduction
Bringing personal status laws into conformity with international and constitutional equal
rights provisions is an imperative for the protection of women’s human rights.
Multicultural secular democracies face a challenge in effectively and meaningfully
guaranteeing the right to equality and the right to religion and culture. Currently, Muslim
marriages are not legally recognized in South Africa.

Nearly 1.5 million of South

Africa’s citizens are Muslims, yet their marriages do not enjoy legal status. Some seek
out the civil law system, but the rest are without formal legislative redress when problems
arise within a marriage. This creates problems for parties in Muslim marriages generally,
but for women in particular, especially in the family law arena.
This report identifies potential constitutional violations that may emerge in the law reform
efforts that are currently taking place in South Africa. It explores amongst other issues,
the tensions between women’s equality rights and religious rights, codification of
religious personal status laws versus recognition of religious marriages, achieving equal
access to justice for all women, and also tensions arising between individual equality
rights and group equality rights.
*

This report reflects research undertaken by students registered in the Clinical Advocacy Course at the Human
Rights Program (HRP), Harvard Law School. HRP offers course work and fosters the participation of students
in human rights activities. Amongst other activities, HRP also develops and supervises student clinical projects.
One of the projects embarked on by students in 2005/6 was that of “[T]he Recognition of Muslim Personal Laws
in South Africa: Implications for Women’s Human Rights”. Students involved in the project included: Mujon
Baghai, Nazia Izuddin, Elodie Moser, Yvonne Osirim, Pranvera Recica and Erica Westernberg. The project was
conceptualised and supervised by Rashida Manjoo (Visiting Fellow, Human Rights Program/ Research Assoc,
Law Faculty- University of Cape Town, South Africa). This report is based on work undertaken over two
semesters by law students and also further work undertaken by the editor. It reflects a narrow and more
legalistic approach to the issue of recognition of religious marriages in South Africa, as opposed to a
sociological or anthropological approach.
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South Africa is in the process of considering separate legislation that will recognize
Muslim marriages. In July 2003, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC)
submitted a report to the Minister of Justice along with proposed draft legislation called
the Muslim Marriages Act (hereinafter referred to as the SALRC bill) which would
recognize Muslim marriages.1 The proposed bill addresses the registration of Muslim
marriages, the dissolution of such marriages, custody of and access to minor children, and
the issue of maintenance (both spousal and child support). Provision is also made for the
regulation of polygynous marriages. According to the SALRC, adoption of the draft bill
would go a long way in creating legal certainty regarding Muslim marriages; it would
give effect to Muslim values; and it would afford better protection to women in those
marriages, in accordance with both Islamic and South African constitutional tenets. The
SALRC draft bill codifies elements of Muslim Personal Laws, by outlining rules for a
variety of marital situations. The provisions in the SALRC bill are similar to provisions
on Muslim Personal Laws as codified or applied in some countries including India,
Nigeria, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Uganda, Tanzania, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Though most
of these countries are multicultural, they succumb to different models of multiculturalism.
Each of these models demonstrates a different approach to Muslim Personal Laws.
Section three below will discuss Ayelet Shachar’s models of multiculturalism and also
some consequences that have arisen in a few Asian and African countries which have
adopted Muslim Personal Laws.
As a consequence of receiving numerous concerns relating to the SALRC Bill, which
revolved around both constitutionality issues generally and women’s right to equality in
particular, the Parliamentary Office of the South African Commission for Gender Equality
(CGE) drafted an alternative draft bill in October 2005. This Bill, called the Recognition
of Religious Marriages Bill (hereinafter referred to as the CGE bill), was produced with
the assistance of the office of the State Law Advisor, and was in fulfillment of the CGE’s
constitutional mandate.2 This is a secular bill, of general application, that provides for the
recognition of all religious marriages and avoids issues of codification of specific
religious tenets, so as to comply with both international and constitutional law
imperatives. It also addresses the lacuna that exists with respect to the non-recognition of
other religious marriages.
4

The CGE Bill was discussed with the SALRC and then handed over to the relevant
executive structures. The hope was that broad public consultations would be held by
them, particularly by the Gender Directorate of the Department of Justice. But neither the
Ministry of Justice nor the Ministry of Home Affairs has acceded to numerous requests
for a meeting with the CGE, nor have they undertaken any public consultations on the
CGE Bill. The most recent development has been the discussion of potential litigation, to
challenge the unconstitutionality of non-recognition of marriages conducted under
Muslim laws.3
In assessing the best approach to the problem of non-recognition of religious marriages,
the South African constitution must be interpreted in its historical context, i.e. by focusing
on fundamentally reversing the effects of racial and gender discrimination that existed
under apartheid. The constitutional mandate is transformative justice and hence the goal
is substantive equality, not just formal equality.4 The centrality of equality is reflected in
the fact that the Constitution sets forth human dignity, equality, and non-sexism as
foundational values.5 South Africa’s courts have stressed that this history of
discrimination and the push to remedy the real-world impact of such wrongs must inform
any interpretation of the Constitution, especially the provisions on equality.6 Taking all
these factors into account, this report attempts to set out the applicable international and
constitutional law obligations; the relevant domestic jurisprudence that is of persuasive
value; and, finally examines a few sections of both draft Bills. The relevant sections that
are examined, relate broadly to the achievement of the rights to substantive gender
equality, freedom of religion and access to justice.

2) Methodology
Students registered in the Clinical Advocacy Course in the Human Rights Program, Harvard
Law School in 2005/6, conducted desktop research on the constitutional validity, impact, and
consequences of the abovementioned bills. Research also included a comparative analysis,
seeking to identify practices and legislative models in select countries in Africa, Asia, Europe
and North America. The one week field work undertaken in October 2005 included: the
presentation of the research at a workshop hosted by the CGE in Cape Town; interviews with
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academics, community members, and government officials; and participation in a seminar
with staff of the CGE. For the purposes of the latter seminar, the students engaged in an indepth discussion on comparisons that reflected their analysis of the differences and also the
implications of both the Bills.†

The findings and debates emanating from the desktop

research and the field-work are reflected in this report. This report will be shared with the
CGE and with relevant civil society organizations. It is hoped that it will be used for the
purposes of advocacy at both the legislative and litigation levels, in respect of the
promulgation of constitutionally sound legislation which recognizes all religious marriages,
without violating women’s human rights. This report uses the term Muslim Personal Laws to
refer to personal status laws emanating from the tenets of Islamic religious sources.

3) Models of multiculturalism
3.1 General
This section largely draws on the work of Ayelet Shachar, who distinguishes between two
different models of multiculturalism: the religious particularist model and the secular
absolutist model. The ‘religious particularist model’ is a governance model in which different
religious communities are vested with legal power over their members’ personal statuses.7
This model addresses the problem of respecting cultural differences by granting religious
communities the authority to follow their own traditions in the family law arena.
Communities are vested with legal power over matters of personal status and property
relations, and the state does not regulate citizens’ marriage and divorce affairs.8
The second model, the ‘secular absolutist model’ is a system in which the state retains
authority over family law matters and all citizens are subject to a uniform secular family law.
Under the secular absolutist model, the state defines legally what constitutes the family and
regulates its creation and dissolution. A uniform secular state law is imposed upon all
citizens in family law matters, regardless of those citizens’ group affiliation(s). Religious
officials have no prescribed role in defining or celebrating marriages.9 In its ideal form, the
†

The speakers and focus of each presentation at the workshop included: Elodie Moser – “Multiculturalism and
Legal Systems - Models at Work”; Nazia Yusuf Izuddin – “A Comparative Analysis of Muslim Personal Law in
Africa and Asia: Indicators for the South African Bill”; and Erica Westenberg – “Constitutional Analysis of
Proposed Muslim Marriages Act”. Mujon Baghai and Yvonne Osirim contributed to the desk-top research which
informed sections of the presentations.
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secular absolutist model denies legal recognition for a marriage or divorce performed by a
representative of a religious family law tradition. It also refuses to acknowledge the possible
distributive aspect of religious family law traditions. In other words, the state does not
allocate any legal authority to the groups over issues of status or property relations, preserving
for itself the ultimate regulatory power over the citizenry in matters of marriage and divorce.
In theory, the key apparent advantage of the secularist absolutist model is that it creates a
legal regime in which the state has a hold over all ministers, which then avoids the claim that
“… the state only supports the practices of the majority [population] in the family law
arena.”10 Hence, all forms of religious marriage and divorce proceedings, whether Christian,
Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, etc, have no legal validity under state law. In practice, however, the
allocation of legal authority set by the secular absolutist model clearly does not advance the
preservation of groups through the accommodation of their diversity: rather it falls short of
respecting and addressing family laws and traditions, other than those that exist in the
dominant religious, social and legal systems.

As Shachar suggests, “… [t]he secular

absolutist model is based on the presumption that religious practices are relegated to the
“private” realm.”11
Shachar argues that one can distinguish the ‘secular absolutist model’ of civil law countries
such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands, in which there is strict separation of church
and state,12 and the ‘modified absolutist system’ employed in Australia, Britain, Canada, and
the United States, which permits some formal recognition of religious traditions, such as by
authorizing religious officials to solemnize marriages.13 In the latter model, the state still
maintains its decisive authoritative power to regulate citizens’ marriage and divorce affairs,
but state family law codes have been rewritten so as to sanction greater cultural diversity. For
instance, civil authorities may invest religious officials with parallel authority to formalize
marriages.14 Shachar points out that “… [t]his [modified absolutist] model is important
because it provides formal recognition of certain aspects of minority communities’ family law
traditions.”15 She also shows that “… [a]t the same time, it created a legal route for secular
authorities to limit the exploitative power used by religious spouses to gain excessive rights in
exchange for religious divorce decrees.”16 However, while this legal arrangement may well
resolve some individual cases of oppression, it does not create any encouragement for
religious communities to reconsider their internal norms. She states … “[T]his model may
7

just incite more reactive culturalist response – even well-meaning modifications by the state
still have the effect of preserving a basic imbalance.”17 Though secular countries can follow
this route to control gender injustice and other forms of religious control in the secular sphere,
the modified absolutist model is unlikely to prevent the violation of women’s human rights.
While the concepts of multiculturalism and legal pluralism have drawn significant scholarly
attention and debate in the past decade, large scale legal pluralism in the area of family law
has not taken root in western industrialized countries. In the United States we see traces of
legal pluralism, where Native Americans retain powers of self-government that extends to
family law. In Australia and New Zealand, Aboriginal and Maori customary law receive
some recognition, but courts do not apply or enforce this customary law directly. In common
law countries, some religious clergy have legal authority to formalize marriages, provided that
the parties obtain a marriage license from the state. With these small exceptions, western
industrialized countries largely maintain unified family law systems, and persons of all
religious, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds are subject to the same family law rules and
institutions. In contrast, a pluralist system can be characterized as one that maintains the
autonomy and sovereignty of different minority cultures.18 Schachar points out both the
benefits and the risks inherent in pluralist systems. She argues that pluralist systems may put
at risk the equality rights of vulnerable group members, while uniform systems might do a
better job at protecting citizenship rights and ensuring equal treatment. On the other hand,
such pluralist systems may also deny the importance of particular cultural or religious norms,
and discriminate against minority groups, whose traditions are distinct from those embedded
within the dominant culture. In Schachar’s view, one solution to achieving the protection and
promotion of both individual and group rights is to have a joint governance system between
the state and the cultural group.19
3.2) Comparing Models from Asia and Africa
This section sets out a brief picture of the challenges and consequences of the adoption of
Muslim Personal Laws in a few Asian and African countries. An unavoidable tension in
codifying Muslim Personal Laws in different contexts is whether to adopt a monolithic or a
pluralistic system. This is partly due to the reality that there is usually neither a homogenous
Muslim community nor a single interpretation of religious laws in that context. Furthermore,
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the issue of the public status and role of religion is also a contested one in many countries. For
example, India, Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and Sri Lanka are secular nations to the extent that
the Constitution does not recognize a state religion. All of these countries, however, have
recognized Muslim citizens to be governed by their personal laws relating to marriage,
divorce, maintenance (spousal and child support), custody and guardianship, and have hence
codified Muslim Personal Laws. On the other hand, the main sources of law in Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Malaysia and Zanzibar are Muslim Laws, with Pakistan and Bangladesh
declaring Islamic Law as the state religion in their constitutions.
Despite the difference in constitutional status granted to religious law there are some parallels
in the effects of application of such laws in these countries. The substance of Muslim
Personal Laws and also the interpretations thereof have given rise to contestation in many
countries, particularly by women’s rights activists. Some questions of concern include: what
constitutes a valid marriage under Muslim Laws; what are valid religious precepts; what are
the rules of spousal maintenance and child support; what are the rights of spouses in a
marriage etc. Though these questions involve the basic tenets of Muslim Personal Laws and
give the impression of certainty as to response and broad consensus on the issues, they have
also evolved into controversies concerning which religious school of interpretation prevails.
The criticism is that giving legitimacy to one school of interpretation excludes the beliefs and
rights of people who adhere to a different school, and this exclusion amounts to
discrimination on the basis of religious belief. In the South African scenario, the SALRC bill
is vulnerable to these criticisms, as it gives priority to one school of interpretation over the
other. As Shafi and Hanafi schools are the dominant schools of interpretation in South
Africa, the legislation tends to exclude Shia practices and certain practices that are particular
to the Maliki and Hanbali schools of interpretation. In the interviews conducted, some people
argued that in choosing one dominant or preferred school of interpretation, the state is
mandating what religious practices should be.

This argument also raised the broader

questions of whether a secular state has the authority to define religious mandates, and also
whether this amounts to a violation of freedom of religion.20
One of the reasons articulated by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Kenya for the codification
of Muslim Personal Laws is the protection of women from exploitation based on religious
9

practices. Unfortunately, women are not protected from exploitation in the above-mentioned
countries or in Nigeria, Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Tanzania. Violations of women’s rights are
common in executing provisions on divorce, polygynous marriages, custody of children and
maintenance in all these countries.21 In some of these countries, courts have also succumbed
to traditional definitions and customary practices and have overruled constitutional law
provisions found in the fundamental rights section of the constitutions. A leading example is
the Shah Bano case, which was decided in India during the 1980’s 22. The case related to a
divorce and maintenance [support] claim of an older woman who had no minor children. The
Indian Supreme Court granted the woman maintenance and in its reasoning justified the
decision under religious law, stating that its conclusion was in line with the Quranic23 spirit of
justice in respect of support for a person in need. Religious leaders objected to the decision
and challenged the court’s authority to interpret the Quran. Despite the progressive decision
of the Supreme Court, the decision could not be enforced, because of extreme pressure from
the religious leaders. As a consequence, a law was passed to effectively invalidate the court’s
decision and which “…deprived all and only Muslim women of the right of maintenance
guaranteed under the Criminal Procedure Code.”24 One of the crucial issues that this case
raises is that of the authority/power that codification processes grant to religious law
implementers, even in a constitutional democracy that guarantees secularism and protection
under a Bill of Rights. The lack of enforceability of a court judgment because of protests by
religious leaders is an indicator of another difficulty with respect to achieving gender justice
in plural legal systems.
There have also been cases in Malaysia and Nigeria that illustrate how the courts override
constitutional law principles and disregard the bills of rights when interpreting religious law.
Cases reveal how traditional definitions (including the definition of obedience) and
interpretations of gender roles play a major role in deciding divorce, maintenance and custody
issues. Some of the implications that have been common to the above mentioned countries in
the process of codifying Muslim Personal Laws include: the violation of constitutional
supremacy; violation of fundamental rights; affirmation of popular and customary views and
beliefs on Islam such as ‘polygamy is a man’s right’; and challenges to the authority of the
secular courts due to the existence of a parallel judicial system based on religious law. The
SALRC bill replicates many provisions relating to Muslim Personal Laws that have been
10

codified in these countries, and this could lead to similar problems.

Amongst other

provisions, the sections relating to maintenance and divorce indicate how the equality
provisions of the constitution are being over-ridden by religious law provisions.

4) South Africa’s International Law Obligations
This section will examine the United Nations system of international human rights law and
the African regional systems of human rights law. From an international law perspective,
there is strong support for individual and gender equality norms, and South African courts are
expressly obliged to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. Section
39(1) of the Constitution states “… when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human
dignity, equality and freedom … and must consider international law.”25 Amongst others,
South Africa has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in
1998; has signed (but not ratified) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1994; has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All
forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1995; and ratified the African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights (African Charter) in 1996. These documents all speak of the
central place of equality norms in a democratic and pluralist society. Articles 18 and 26 of the
ICCPR, in particular, promote both the individual’s freedom of religion and the right to
equality.

Also, article 16 of CEDAW infuses this generalized language with much-

appreciated specificity. It commands States Parties to “… ensure, on a basis of equality of
men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their
free and full consent;
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status,
in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be
paramount;
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(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of
their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable
them to exercise these rights;
(f) The same rights and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship,
trusteeship and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts exist
in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount;
(g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to choose a
family name, a profession and an occupation;
(h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition of property, whether free of
charge or for a valuable consideration.”26
The preamble of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights sets out a duty for state
members to achieve genuine equality and dignity for all people and dismantle all forms of
discrimination.

It honors both the universalist aspirations of the UN Charter and the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also the traditions and values of Africa which
should “… inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and peoples'
rights.”27 Relevant articles include:
(a)Article 2 entitles every individual to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms in the
Charter, without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, color, sex, religion etc.
(b) Article 3 states that every individual shall be equal before the law and be entitled to
equal protection of the law.
(c) Article 8 guarantees freedom of conscience, profession and free practice of religion.
(d) Article 17(2) and (3) states that “Every individual may freely take part in the cultural
life of his [sic] community. The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values
recognized by the community shall be the duty of the State” (emphasis added).28
(e) Article 18(3) requires states to eliminate “every discrimination against women”
(emphasis added) and to protect women’s rights “as stipulated in international declarations
and conventions”. In this way, the African Charter emphasizes women’s rights by referring
to pertinent international law, such as the ICCPR and CEDAW.
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(f) Article 19 states that “All peoples shall be equal; they shall enjoy the same respect and
shall have the same rights. Nothing shall justify the domination of a people by another.”
(g) Article 20 refers to the “unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination.” At
first glance, the question that arises is whether the peoples referred to signify groups
determined by nationality (e.g., South Africans) or race, ethnicity, culture, or religion (e.g.,
Muslims).
(h) Article 23, however, suggests that the former interpretation (i.e. national group) is
closer to the truth when it says that “All peoples shall have the right to national and
international peace and security.”29
South Africa is one of fifteen nations that have ratified the Maputo Protocol, formally called
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in
Africa. The Maputo Protocol, which was adopted by the African Union in July 2003 and
came into force on 25 November 2005, speaks most directly to the issues at hand. The
Protocol comprehensively enumerates the rights of women, imposing obligations on the
ratifying states to ensure maximum protection of women’s rights, prevent discrimination and
undertake measures to ensure women are given appropriate space for development, equal
opportunities and full protection of social, economic and civil rights. The preamble proclaims
the rights of women to be “… inalienable, interdependent and indivisible human rights” and
states its determination to enable women to “… enjoy fully all their human rights.”30 The
strength of this language is significant in trying to create a hierarchy of rights. Specifically, it
compels the state to take positive action of both a legislative and a social, cultural,
educational nature. Relevant articles include:
a) Article 2 states that “… harmful cultural and traditional practices…” are those which
“… are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes, or
on stereotyped roles for women and men.”
b) The above provision is strengthened by Article 17, which states that women “…shall
have the right to live in a positive cultural context and to participate at all levels in the
determination of cultural policies.” While there will certainly be disagreement over
what constitutes a positive cultural context, the implication is that the cultural context
is not and should not be static or fixed, and also that tradition is not inviolate if it is
13

deemed not to be “positive” for women. The statement guaranteeing women the right
to participate in the determination of cultural policies suggests that women should be,
in large part, the ones deciding on what is positive for them. This suggests that
tradition is not inviolate, and such change as is necessary to promote the free
development of women’s personalities is encouraged.31
c) Article 6 on marriage could scarcely be clearer in requiring states parties to “… ensure
that women and men enjoy equal rights and are regarded as equal partners in
marriage.” Article 6(c) states that “… monogamy is encouraged as the preferred form
of marriage and that the rights of women in marriage and family, including in
polygamous marital relationship, are promoted and protected.” The Protocol, while
promoting monogamous marriages, recognizes the existence of polygamous marriages
and the need for protection of the rights and interests of women in those marriages.
d) Article 7 ensures protection of women’s rights by law, requiring that all marriages
must be annulled or divorced by judicial order. Article 7 states that “States Parties
shall enact appropriate legislation to ensure that women and men enjoy the same rights
in case of separation, divorce or annulment of marriage.” This entails that they shall
(1) have the same rights to seek separation, divorce or annulment of a marriage; (2)
have reciprocal rights and responsibilities towards their children; (3) have the right to
an equitable sharing of the joint property deriving from the marriage. In short, these
provisions are notable because they conflict with those found in both the SALRC and
the CGE bills.
e) Article 8 requires reform of relevant discriminatory laws.
Thus, these various provisions in the Maputo Protocol demonstrate – some more clearly than
others – an ultimate recognition that where the individual rights of women collide with the
cultural or religious rights of a group, it is the former that must be given special protection.
The African Court on Human Rights, a judicial mechanism of the African Charter on Human
and People’s Rights, is also empowered to apply the African Charter and also any other
human rights treaty or convention ratified by the state parties. Thus provisions in both the
Maputo Protocol and the African charter enable the both the domestic and the regional courts
to draw on a broader pool of norms protecting human, and more particularly in this case,
women’s human rights.
14

5) Relevant Constitutional Provisions
As stated previously, the South African Constitution should be interpreted in light of its
historical context and its attempt to remedy the effects of both racial and gender
discrimination. This remedial objective is embodied in its Preamble which states “…the
people of South Africa recognize the injustices of our past … adopt this Constitution as the
supreme law of the Republic so as to: Heal the divisions of the past and establish a society
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights [and] . . . Improve
the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person” (emphasis added).32
This purpose can also be seen in the main text of the Constitution, especially the Bill of
Rights.

Chapter 1, Section 1 sets out human dignity, equality, and non-sexism as

foundational values. The constitutional guarantee of equality (s 9(1)) is the very first in the
list of rights, and as such enjoys a special prominence. The Constitutional Court has often
voiced this view, stating that “… the guarantee of equality lies at the very heart of the
Constitution.

It permeates and defines the very ethos upon which the Constitution is

premised.”33 Thus, in evaluating the proposed bills recognizing Muslim marriages, one
should be keenly attuned to where they may heal some divisions and where they may instead
create others. Moreover, one cannot rightfully ignore the problems of lingering patriarchal
norms which sustain and idealize gender inequality and gender discrimination, either in
theory or in practice, de jure or de facto.

Section 15 of the Bill of Rights provides that “Everyone has the right to freedom of
conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion,” adding in section 15(3)(a) that this does not
prevent legislation recognizing marriages or systems of personal or family law under any
tradition or religion, so long as such recognition is consistent with this and other provisions of
the Constitution (s15(3)(b)) (emphasis added). This condition is significant. First, it suggests
that such legislation may conflict with other provisions of the Bill of Rights. Second, if it
does, it clarifies that such legislation is subject to all other rights, including the equality right.
Section 31 creates a similar limitation. It mandates that “Persons belonging to a cultural,
religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that
community to (a) enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language.” Despite
15

this strong proclamation, the section goes on to state that these rights “… may not be
exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.”34 In contrast, the
equality clauses contain no such internal limitation, or ‘but’ clause.
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act35 is not simply
relevant law, but also evidence of how the South African legislature interprets its own
constitutional mandate. The guiding principle it stresses is the eradication of systemic racial
and gender discrimination and inequality, which was injected into South African politics,
economy, society, and psyche by an ill-famed triumvirate: colonialism, apartheid, and
patriarchy.36 Chapter 2, section 8 of the Act is devoted to clarifying the contours of gender
discrimination. As such, it outlaws “… any practice, including traditional, customary or
religious practice, which impairs the dignity of women and undermines equality between
women and men.”37
In adopting legislation to recognize Muslim marriages, balancing the rights of women and the
rights of religious groups is at the heart of staying true to the Constitution and overcoming the
history of discrimination. As indicated earlier, where these foundational rights collide, the
equality of women must take precedence. The recognition of Muslim marriages on a par with
all other religious marriages is not precluded.

But cultural and religious rights, unlike

equality rights, are subject to limitations described above, as well as the general limitations
clause in section 36 of the Constitution. So, in determining the scope of the right to religion
and the right to equality, it is the former which may not be read so as to infringe on the
equality right, especially since non-sexism is one of the foundational values of the Republic
of South Africa.

Finally, as Wayne van der Meide has argued, “[A]lthough culture is

practiced within and defined in reference to a group, in the Bill of Rights it is an individual,
not a collective, right. Generally, therefore, the right to culture cannot be used to protect the
interests of a group at the expense of the rights to equality, non-discrimination and inherent
human dignity of individuals.”38

6) Relevant Jurisprudence
The right to equality has been widely explored by South Africa’s courts. The Constitutional
Court set out an equality test in Harksen v. Lane NO and Others,39 which mandated that any
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discrimination on the grounds of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion, disability and other
grounds enumerated in the s9 of the constitution, is considered to be unconstitutional. The
Court recognized both, past historical discrimination women faced in marriages in South
Africa and also current experiences of women in relation to matrimonial property and the
division of labor within the household, and how these factors compounded and further
entrenched deep inequalities between women and men. While the test developed in the
Harksen case certainly gives guidelines for determining absolute breaches of equality, it does
not help to determine the balancing that must be done between gender and religious equality.
In Bhe and Others v the Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others, 40 the Constitutional Court
resolved a conflict between African customary law and individual rights. In examining the
rule of male primogeniture, which prohibited and discriminated against women’s right to
inherit property, the Court held that the customary law of succession, based largely on
primogeniture, discriminates unfairly against women, both on the grounds of race and gender.
This case supports the conclusion that when a conflict of rights arises, the right to gender
equality takes precedence over cultural and religious rights.
South Africa’s case law post-apartheid provides important direction on the legal treatment of
Muslim marriages, the right to freedom of religion, and the right to gender equality. A few
cases deal with the issue of Muslim marriages specifically and the right to marry generally.
The pre-democracy era cases stand in sharp contrast to subsequent jurisprudence emanating
from the courts. Under colonialism and apartheid, there was a refusal on the part of both the
legislature and the courts to afford legal protection to parties in a Muslim marriage. The
reason largely was that these marriages were viewed as potentially polygamous [polygynous]
and thus contra bonos mores and hence were not regarded as legally valid. The views
expressed in pre-democracy era cases were based on the dominant views on what religions
and practices constituted civilized religious practices; what unions were considered an
anathema to the dominant Christian norms; what marriages would not be reprobated by the
majority of civilized peoples on grounds of morality and religion; what marriages were
contrary to public policy etc.41 As we observe in the cases below, the courts have recognized
the importance that religion has in this society, but have refused to use religious doctrine to
interpret the constitution.

17

Ryland v. Edros42 is a seminal example of the different approach to Muslim marriages
adopted by the courts, when faced with an action for claims arising out of a marriage which
was dissolved by Muslim Personal Laws. The Court asserted that the Constitution’s values
prohibited the imposition of a dominant community’s preferences and prejudices (in this case
prejudice against Muslim polygynous marriages) in a plural society like South Africa.43 At
first glance, this might seem to support the argument that liberal/secular preferences for
gender equality could not be imposed on the Muslim community. However, it is important to
note that the Ryland decision was based on constitutional values, one of which is non-sexism.
Thus, the Ryland case points towards the conclusion that the right to religious freedom
emanates from the Constitution itself and, thus, religious freedom cannot be pursued without
due regard to other central constitutional values, such as gender equality.
Amod v. Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund44 was a case related to compensation for
the loss of support suffered as a consequence of the death of her husband in a car accident.
The respondent had refused to pay compensation because Islamic marriages were not lawful
at common law, since they were seen as contrary to good public policy, as they allowed for
the practice of polygamy [polygyny].45 The Court, in giving recognition to the duty of
support owed to the appellant, recognized the existence of a de facto monogamous Muslim
marriage.
In Daniels v. Campbell NO and others

46

the Constitutional Court held that persons married

according to Muslim rites were spouses for the purposes of inheritance where the deceased
died without leaving a will. The court held further that the exclusion of people married under
Muslim rites from the protection of the legislation in question is clearly an unjustifiably
discriminatory remnant from the apartheid era. The common factor in the abovementioned
cases was that in all instances the court was prepared to provide some remedy, but at the same
time the court has consistently refused to recognize the legal status of marriages which are
concluded under Muslim rites.
In addition, the recent Minister of Home Affairs and Another v. Fourie and Another47 decision
on same-sex marriages asserted that the compass by which the ‘right to marry’ cases are
decided should be South Africa’s modern equality jurisprudence – which has focused on the
values of human dignity, equality and freedom – rather than religious texts.48 The court
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declared, “[I]t is one thing for the Court to acknowledge the important role that religion plays
in our public life. It is quite another to use religious doctrine as a source for interpreting the
Constitution. It would be out of order to employ the religious sentiments of some as a guide
to the constitutional rights of others.”49 The Fourie case lends strong support to the contention
that, in the marriage context, religious norms cannot outweigh the constitutionally-protected
right to equality, and hence the inability of parties to lawfully marry their same sex partners
constitutes discrimination. In summing up the jurisprudence, the Constitutional Court of
South Africa has expanded the concept of marriage from a union of one man and one woman,
to include same sex marriages; but it has also declined to recognize the legal validity of
marriages conducted under the tenets of Muslim Laws.
The Constitutional Court has also faced another freedom of religion issue, i.e. whether giving
special recognition to one religious group is unfair to other religious groups that lack such
special recognition. In S v. Solberg50, the majority held that state endorsement of a particular
religion would not infringe on the right to freedom of religion, as long as the endorsement did
not have a coercive effect. However, Justice O’Regan strongly dissented, and argued that any
such endorsement would not be permitted in South Africa’s new constitutional order.51
An important issue that Solberg raises in the Muslim marriages context is whether the
SALRC draft bill creates ‘coercive effects’. As will be outlined in the section below, one
may well argue that the SALRC draft bill does this, insofar as it gives preferential treatment
to some Islamic schools of interpretation over others and reinforces women’s lesser socioeconomic status and autonomy, especially with regard to making religious and marital
choices. There is additional case law on the legal treatment of the right to freedom of religion,
but not specifically on the issue of Muslim marriages. Due to the constraints of space, such
cases will not be discussed here.

7) Some implications of the SALRC and CGE Approaches
The SALRC draft bill (Muslim Marriages Act) and the CGE draft bill (Recognition of
Religious Marriages Bill) take vastly different approaches to giving Muslim marriages legal
status.

Although several potential constitutional violations emerge from both proposed
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statutes, they will not all be addressed in this report.52 The views expressed by interviewees
will be utilized in the discussion of a few provisions of both bills, including the scope of
application; concerns arising due to codification of religious law; and, potential violation of
women’s equality rights.53 The report will address potential problems that focus on the
provisions relating to divorce, matrimonial property regimes and maintenance.
7.1) Scope of Application
The SALRC bill applies only to Muslim marriages while the CGE bill applies to all religious
marriages. The interviews reveal that some people are concerned that it is not fair to provide
recognition of the tenets of one religious group and not to others. Other people argued that
such recognition is patronizing to Muslims, as other religious groups are left to regulate
themselves. 54 The CGE bill may be seen to remedy this criticism as it seeks to recognize all
religious marriages, rather than to codify specific elements of any religious laws. It thus
becomes possible to address the problem of non-recognition of religious marriages and at the
same time treat all religions equally within the context of a single act. Another challenge
raised is the issue of legitimization of polygynous marriages through the SALRC Bill. Such
legitimization is seen as infringing women’s rights and is thus in direct violation of s9(2) of
the Constitution. Both bills propose recognition of polygynous marriages, with the SALRC
bill also providing for the regulation of polygamous marriages. Neither bill provides for the
outlawing of the practice (even at some point in the future), thus ignoring the issues of
substantive equality and the realization of the inherent human dignity of women, in religious
communities.55
7.2) Some Implications of the Codification Approach
It is important to firstly explore why the SALRC took the codification approach. The SALRC
looked to the Constitution for legal support of codification of Muslim personal law. 56 Section
15 of the Constitution opens the door by allowing for legislation recognizing systems of
personal and family law under any tradition or adhered to by persons professing a particular
religion - although any such legislation must be consistent with the rest of the Constitution.
Also, the argument asserted in the SALRC Discussion Paper 101 was that Muslims currently
had difficulty enforcing maintenance, termination of marriage, proprietary, and custody rights
arising from their marriages and, thus, legislation must be specifically aimed at correcting
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these practical problems. The assertion was that women and children would be protected by
specified substantive regulations.57 Of those interviewed, many people generally maintained
that religious leaders had a strong influence over the SALRC Project Committee on the draft
bill and that these leaders generally supported codification. One example cited, as common
knowledge amongst many people in the Muslim community, was that the SALRC adopted the
Muslim judge requirement in response to calls from religious (ulama) bodies.58
Thus, codification was asserted by the SALRC as a way to actively provide social protection
in marital and family problems.

The sections below will outline how the codification

approach utilized in this bill has, in fact, accomplished the exact opposite of this goal, instead
putting women and children at a greater disadvantage, both inter-groups and intra-groups.
Many of these provisions are onerous in terms of a burden of proof; and they also presuppose
access to knowledge and an equal power of parties to negotiate mutually favorable terms. The
codification of religious laws approach focuses on protecting the religious group, with the
emphasis being on formalizing group norms and institutions. In contrast, the recognition of
religious marriages approach focuses on protecting the rights of the religious individual, with
the emphasis being on personal choice of forum. Because individuals, especially women, are
often subjugated even within protected minority groups, and because the individual is the
lowest common denominator of both individual and group rights there is a greater imperative
to protect individuals.
The SALRC bill seeks to codify elements of Muslim Personal Laws via the legislation itself
and via the jurisprudence of Muslim judges and assessors. For example, it outlines rules for
several marital situations relating to divorce practices such as talaq and khula59 and postdivorce practices such as iddah.60 In addition, this bill also prescribes that cases be tried by
Muslim judges and assessors who have special knowledge of Islamic law. Many problems
arise from this approach. At one level the concerns raised over codification of religious laws
reflect a broader concern that the practices of many religious laws, including Muslim Personal
Laws, are biased against women. The SALRC bill gives religious leaders greater discretion
and authority, especially by mandating that Muslim judges and institutions play a central role
in dispute resolution. This allows for the application of a variety of interpretations of religious
laws, potentially in a biased manner.
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During interviews, some interviewees stated that the SALRC chose elements of Muslim
Personal Laws in a piecemeal manner, picking and choosing from the four main schools of
thought without regard to internal consistency or religious authenticity. Also, it was argued
that by doing this, the state is attempting to legislate on the fundamentals of religious laws.
This raises the broader question of whether the state has the authority to define religious
mandates. Some also argued that the very act of crystallizing a specific set of religious rules
in a piece of legislation goes against religious freedom and integrity, because religious tenets
evolve and change over time and in different contexts.61 Many interviewees criticized the
SALRC’s process of consultation when drafting the bill, noting that women’s voices were not
adequately represented.62 Furthermore, the bill has raised dissent amongst Muslim scholars,
with many holding that it violates freedom of religion by prescribing religious practices under
coerciveness of state sanctions, and that it also infringes the autonomy of religious
institutions.63 It is argued that the Constitution of South Africa provides for the separation of
state and religion and that this gives the government the power to provide religious groups the
freedom to practice their religion. However, under the SALRC bill, the government exceeds
this authority and prescribes what Islamic Law is, and, it also promotes a particular
understanding of religion, thereby interpreting religious laws. As Motala holds “… the bill
(SALRC) is not based on voluntarism. Instead, the state is attempting to prescribe how to
worship or practice one’s faith. The state should not be permitted to force or influence a
person to profess a belief in a certain way.” Further Motala suggests that there is a risk of
alienating the Muslim communities in South Africa, because not all of them are in agreement
with the prescriptions and interpretations provided for in the bill.64
Furthermore, in some interviews people expressed the belief that the SALRC’s codification
approach meant that many actions brought under the Act would eventually end up in the
appeals process, on grounds of unconstitutionality, resulting in a cycle of appellate courts
reversing the findings of Muslim judges. This is problematic as it allows non-Muslims to
determine norms of Muslim Personal Laws, which is precisely what the SALRC bill sought to
avoid by providing for the appointment of Muslim judges. Also, it sets up a dynamic of
conflict between the secular state and the religious community, which again undermines one
of the main objectives behind the proposed law. Furthermore, by creating a special role for
Muslim judges and attorneys as judicial officers, the SALRC bill may convey existing
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distributional problems into the courtroom, thus contravening constitutional requirements. A
history of gender discrimination likely restricts the number of female Muslim judges and
attorneys. This issue is extremely relevant as recent judicial reform efforts have been focused
on empowerment of women in the judiciary.65 The CGE bill does not provide for the
appointment of Muslim judges.

Finally, an even deeper problem is that, by formally

codifying elements of religious laws, this bill would give any such underlying bias the weight
of state sanction. It is this state approval that would bring applied religious law out of the
private sphere and under the protection of state law, and not necessarily in a genderresponsive manner. Thus, the codification approach is problematic because it opens the door
for the application of Muslim Personal Laws in a manner that potentially violates many
constitutional provisions.
The CGE draft bill seeks only to recognize religious marriages and avoids issues of
codification of specific religious tenets. This approach is preferable for several reasons. First,
recognition rectifies the central problem of Muslim marriages lacking legal status. Second,
the recognition approach balances the competing rights of gender equality and
culture/religion, whereas the non-recognition and codification approaches allow one right to
consume the other. That is, under the recognition model, a woman can either choose to have
her dispute settled in the private religious sphere by a religious individual or institution, or
she can use the fact that her marriage has legal status to trigger the mechanisms and laws of
the secular legal arena. Therefore, the recognition model does not negate or disadvantage the
application of Muslim Personal Laws; it simply gives people the option of utilizing either a
religious or a secular forum.

This approach seems eminently practicable since many

interviewees indicated that many Muslim women already currently engage in such forum
shopping, in the quest to resolve marital issues.66
It is important to note the limitations of the recognition of religious marriages approach.
Because recognition leaves the private religious sphere unfettered, it leaves unfixed many of
the underlying biases against women, on the part of religious leaders and institutions, just as
codification goes too far in the other direction by lending state approval to these biased actors
and institutions. This tension results in the conclusion that laws are not a panacea for dealing
with violations of women’s human rights arising out of religious practices and that other
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remedies must also be pursued. Another limitation is that the CGE bill effectively forces
women to choose between an exclusive religious option and a secular option, whereas the
SALRC bill seems to have some moderating effect through the appeals process. Also, in
theory women have a choice of forum, but in practice this is not the case, as
threats/coercion/fear etc may prevent them choosing the secular realm even if they wanted to.
7.3) Potential Violations of Women’s Equality Rights
The SALRC bill provisions on divorce reveal a lack of clarity, disparate levels of power
granted to male spouses (i.e. the entrenchment of legal inequality), and also a failure to pursue
the substantive equality of women. For example, section 9(2) of the SALRC Bill provides
that a court may terminate a Muslim marriage on any ground permitted by Islamic law. Yet,
the bill fails to identify any of these grounds and thus opens the door to gender-biased
interpretations of religious grounds.

The CGE bill, on the other hand, simplifies and

equalizes rights in divorce. It states that only a court may dissolve a marriage and the civil
law standard of ‘irretrievable breakdown’ is sufficient ground for dissolution purposes.
Unfortunately, the CGE bill also makes reference to ensuring that the marriage is dissolved
according to religious tenets, prior to a court process of dissolution. The implications here
include: having to deal with conservative religious institutions, bargaining in the shadow of
the law with recalcitrant husbands, delayed processes etc. Also, the SALRC Bill, in codifying
different forms of divorce and post-divorce practices, openly spells out and formalizes
inequality in the law by giving the husband greater freedom to end the marriage. This is a
violation of both domestic and international laws. One example is a provision on divorce
which prohibits remarriage, for a mandatory waiting period of 130 days for a woman who is
not pregnant and until the time of delivery for a woman who is pregnant (i.e. the iddah
period).67
The process of dissolution of marriages under the SALRC Bill is another example of the
different treatment in respect of divorce processes accorded to the Muslim community as
compared to both civil law and customary law divorces. Under the SALRC bill, compulsory
mediation is the first step in the process of dispute resolution. This can be followed by
arbitration, and finally litigation if the matter is not resolved. Court proceedings will have to
be presided over by a Muslim judge. Failing the existence of a Muslim judge in that Court,
24

the matter will have to be heard by a Muslim attorney (who would be designated as an actingjudge). Courts would be assisted by two Muslim assessors who have specialized knowledge
of Islamic Laws. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal would submit questions of Islamic
Law to two accredited Muslim institutions.
Numerous problems are evident in this approach. First, in court cases, the application of
Islamic laws could introduce gender bias into both the procedure and substance of the case.
Second, as noted earlier, by creating a special role for Muslim judges and attorneys as judicial
officers, the SALRC bill may convey existing distributional problems into the courtroom.
Third, because this bill mandates compulsory mediation, only Muslim people would be made
to go through this additional procedural ‘hoop’ in order to gain access to the formal justice
system. This puts Muslims at a disadvantage vis-à-vis non-Muslims with regard to their
constitutionally protected right to have access to both due process and effective justice.
Fourth, because arbitration is a private process, there is concern that gender bias will proceed
unchecked by public scrutiny. Studies have found that private bargaining in family law tends
to yield inferior results for many women.68 The CGE bill does not stipulate the appointment
of religious judges, nor does it mandate compulsory mediation prior to adjudication processes
for divorce.

Hence, any underlying gender biases in the religious norms are further

entrenched by the SALRC Bill, but neither are they fully confronted by the CGE Bill.
In the SALRC bill, the default position in respect of matrimonial property regimes for
Muslim marriages is, as marriages out of community of property, excluding the accrual
system. This is in contrast to the default system in both the civil law, i.e. the Marriage Act 25
of 1961 and also, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, which provide
for a default system of ‘in community of property’. The SALRC bill provides that each
spouse maintains his or her own estate and any growth accrued during the marriage will not
be split between the two. This can be modified by a pre-nuptial contract, prior to the marriage
ceremony. These provisions could serve to disadvantage women as male spouses can often
more easily acquire hard assets during a marriage, while women may contribute more
intangibly to family resources. Given the backdrop of existing gender inequality in terms of
socio-economic resources, women are less able to assert their interests and demand an antenuptial contract.

Also, under this bill, an application by the husband to enter into a
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subsequent marriage, may lead to the court dividing or terminating, an existing matrimonial
property system. On the other hand, the CGE bill asserts that marriages will be governed by
the tenets of the parties’ religion. Although, this offers more room for the application of more
equitable rules by the parties, by leaving the issues of proprietary consequences to the tenets
of the religion, women in Muslim marriages are not protected from biased religious norms.
In terms of maintenance, the SALRC bill mandates that a husband supports his wife during
marriage and for a limited period post-divorce (the iddah period)69, and that he pays child
support to her upon divorce, but it has no provision for the payment of alimony. In contrast,
the CGE bill would invoke the provisions of laws of general application that apply to
marriage, divorce and maintenance. This is especially important since realistically in South
Africa, many women traditionally labor in an unpaid or informal sector of the economy i.e.
largely maintaining the household and caring for children. Furthermore, because of the
historical legacy of a denial of education opportunities for non-white [black/people of color]
people, women often lack the education and training required to later enter the work force if
necessary. Hence, the lack of an equitable matrimonial system and a provision for alimony
threatens to leave many women in financial jeopardy, if not utter destitution. As a result, this
omission unfairly discriminates against women, both formally and substantively, de jure and
de facto. The SALRC bill serves to further entrench inequality in South African law between
Muslim and non-Muslim women.

8) Conclusion
It is acknowledged that law is only one part of any solution relating the achievement of
women’s human rights and substantive gender equality. Law is not a panacea for underlying
social inequities, both structural and systemic. It will ultimately be up to South Africans to
give life and meaning to the rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. Article 2 of the Maputo
Protocol exhorts governments to seek the elimination of discrimination against women not
only through legislative measures, but also through the modification “… of social and cultural
patterns of conduct of women and men through public education, information, education and
communication strategies, with a view to achieving the elimination of harmful cultural and
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traditional practices and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the
superiority of either of the sexes, or on stereotyped roles for women and men.”70
There is a spectrum of opportunities to give status to Muslim marriages. On one end is the
present state of non-recognition, which is harmful de facto to women and so flagrantly
disregarding of the constitutional right to religion and culture of Muslim South Africans. On
the opposite end is the SALRC bill. Its codification of Muslim Personal laws opens a
Pandora’s Box of constitutional quagmires that threatens to swallow whole the social justice
mission embodied in the right to gender equality.

In the middle stands the CGE bill,

recognizing all religious marriages, but not codifying any religion. It partly represents the
hope of a society in which the rights to equality and to culture, religion, and tradition may
flourish side by side.

The Constitution of South Africa is consciously an instrument

committed to social justice, transformation and reconstruction. Thus any attempt to change,
modify, challenge or violate the constitutional values and norms is required to be justified and
must be judged in terms of the consequences and the impact it may induce. The constitutional
provision under Chapter 2, article 7(2) holds a compelling obligation for the government
indicating that it is required to undertake actions to ensure equal and fair implementation of
rights. It gives rise to affirmative duties for the government to take proactive and affirmative
steps to ensure that rights of individuals are not violated or infringed, not only by the state,
but also by private parties.

Many country experiences demonstrate that codification of Muslim Personal Laws poses
constitutional as well as religious law challenges. These challenges raise questions for states
engaging in this process, to reconsider and revisit codification as the approach to recognition
of religious laws.

Such experiences also emphasize the highly delicate subject of

accommodation in the family law arena, including essential problems underlying the current
theoretical and legal models for dividing jurisdiction over individuals with multiple
affiliations. In the South African multicultural context, the issue of recognition of Muslim
marriages is of concern to its very plural fabric. Hence, its approach to multiculturalism is
decisive to both its secularist and pluralist identity. The situation South Africa is faced with
now demands a closer look at the different models of multiculturalism various countries have
followed, and also the impact of their approaches in the recognition of Muslim Personal
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Laws.

The South African context requires institutional scrutiny that can appreciate the

situational complexity faced by individuals who are culturally and legally tied to both the
group and the state. The challenge is balancing equality rights and the right to religion. From
a social science perspective – from the perspective of life as it is lived as opposed to law as it
is written – a codification bill, such as the SALRC bill, will be harmful to women even when
it appears neutral, such as when it allows women to enter anti-nuptial contracts to change the
matrimonial regime. The reality in South Africa is that women are generally of a lower
socioeconomic status than men; hence it is highly unlikely that they will be able to truly use
such provisions to protect their interests. Turning a blind eye to such realities promotes and
perpetuates the social inequalities the Constitution was designed to address. The problem that
has been identified is that of non-recognition of religious marriages. This is a problem that is
faced by the Muslim community as well as other religious communities. The legislative
solution that is required is one of recognizing religious marriages, while avoiding codifying
any particular religion.
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